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Broad: Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Florida
NO TES
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN FLORIDA'
THE PROBLEM OF THE INSOLVENT MOTORIST

Florida wages a two-front war upon the problem of traffic accidents. While traffic engineers and law-enforcement officials seek
ways to decrease the incidence of accidents, the state legislature attempts to shift the burden of loss from the injured party to the insurance company - an organization especially designed to absorb loss
and distribute it throughout society.
Significant progress has been made toward protecting citizens from
uninsured and financially irresponsible motorists. Largely as a result
of the adoption and strict enforcement of the financial responsibility
law, 2 eighty-seven per cent of all motor vehicles registered in Florida
are now insured. 3 It may be presumed that some of the owners and
drivers of uninsured automobiles are financially responsible. Allowing also for uninsured motorists that are not at fault, it has been
estimated that less than two per cent of innocent traffic victims are
not paid for their injuries by the guilty party.4
Although the financial responsibility law has greatly diminished
the number of uninsured automobiles registered in Florida, the law
does not require a motorist to establish financial responsibility until
his license has been suspended for certain traffic convictions or his
automobile has been involved in an accident.G Only then must he
establish financial responsibility for future accidents. This is usually
done by purchasing a public liability insurance policy with minimum
limits of $10,000 per person, $20,000 per accident, and $5,000 property damage. 6 Moreover, the law cannot effectively provide protection against non-resident uninsured motorists. This is of particular
importance in Florida, where 2,194,354 cars from other states traveled
the highways during the last half of 1958 and 13,738 non-resident
motorists were involved in accidents during that year. 7 When the

1. See Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 516 (1960). for an excellent discussion of
California's uninsured motorist law. This note is based, in part, upon the organization of that analysis and discusses similar problems in the context of Florida law.
A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this note.
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1961).
3.
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damage caused by hit-and-run drivers and by operators of stolen cars,
cars driven without permission, and unregistered cars is added to
that caused by out-of-state motorists, it is clear that the present system
does not provide sufficient coverage. Several solutions have been
proposed or attempted, such as compulsory insurance, the Saskatchewan Plan, and unsatisfied claim and judgment funds.8 The insurance
industry's plan, now adopted by the Florida legislature, is the uninsured motorist endorsement.
HISTORY OF THE UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT

In January 1954, several insurance companies added an unsatisfied judgment endorsement to their policies, with annual premiums
ranging from $5.00 to $7.50. The insurer agreed to pay the insured,
within limits specified by the endorsement, the amount of any uncollectible judgment for bodily injury rendered against the uninsured
tort-feasor. Shortly thereafter some insurers added property damage
coverage and agreed to pay certain classes of claims without the
necessity of reducing them to judgment. 9
In October 1955, insurers issuing policies in the State of New
York offered both broad and limited forms of uninsured motorist
insurance. The broad form, which assumed negligence on the part
of the uninsured driver, cost $4.00. The limited form adopted by
most insurers required proof of legal liability and cost $2.50. Both
of these forms have been largely discontinued. 10
In December 1956, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau adopted an endorsement
covering bodily injury. It was available only with a family automobile policy and provided the same minimum limits as those defined in the New York financial responsibility law."1
In April 1957, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company offered an endorsement prescribing payments as defined
in a death and dismemberment schedule instead of allowing the
determination of damages by negotiation between the parties.' 2
Uninsured motorist coverage is the insurance industry's present
answer to compulsory insurance. Since its introduction it has steadily
8. For a brief outline of these plans, see Plummer, The Uncompensated Automobile Accident Victim, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 78 (1957). For a more detailed treatment of the various alternatives, see Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 TEXAS
L. REv. 154 (1959).
9. Plummer, Handling Claims Under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 415
INs. L. J. 494 (1957).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Form 9415. See George, Insuring
Injuries Caused by Uninsured Motorists, 406 INs. L. J. 715, 718 (1956).
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grown in popularity. New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, South
Carolina, California, and now Florida, under wholly different statutory regulations, require companies to issue the endorsement with all
automobile liability policies. 13
THE FLORIDA UNINSURED

MOTORIST STATUTE

The new law, section 627.0851 (1) of Florida Statutes 1961, requires that every automobile liability policy delivered or issued for
delivery in the state with respect to motor vehicles registered or principally garaged in the state shall contain an uninsured motorist endorsement covering bodily injury within the minimum limits prescribed by the financial responsibility law.' 4 The state insurance
department has broadly construed the statute to apply not only to
policies insuring vehicles of all uses and types but also to non-ownership liability policies, employers' ownership policies, Division 2
Garage liability policies, and all others covering liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle registered
or principally garaged in the state.15
The statute provides that any insured named in the policy may
reject the coverage.' 6 A policy covering an uninsured motor vehicle
is deemed to include an insured motor vehicle when the liability
insurer of the tort-feasor becomes insolvent within one year after
the accident.'1 The insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured
to the extent of any payment made under the coverage.' 8
The statute became effective as of July 1, 1961. Assume that an
insurance company "delivered or issued for delivery" a standard
automobile liability policy to Able on June 15, 1961, but that the
policy had an effective date of July 15, 1961. Able was subsequently
injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist and filed a claim.
The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the policy was "delivered or issued for delivery" before the effective date of the statute.
The Attorney General of Florida has sustained the insurer's position
on the grounds that "laws are not to be given a retrospective application unless there is clearly a legislative intent that they be so applied"
13.

N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§268:15, 412:2-a (Supp. 1961); VA. CODE ANN.

§§38.1-381 (Supp. 1960), 46.1-167.6 (Rep1. Vol. 1958, Supp. 1960); N.Y. INS. LAw
art. 17-A (Supp. 1961); S.C. CODE §§46-750.23-1-6 (Supp. 1960); CAL. INS. CODE
§11580.2 (Deering Supp. 1961); FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1961). A copy of the Florida
statute is set out in Appendix A.
14. There is no requirement that the endorsement cover property damage.
15. Letter from Norman R. Thomas, Deputy Commissioner, to Glens Falls
Ins. Co., Aug. 18, 1961.
16. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1) (1961).
17. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (2), (3) (1961).
18. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (4) (1961).
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and that regulatory legislation is to be strictly construed.-0 This
opinion is founded on the assumption that the Florida courts will
interpret the words delivered or issued for delivery to refer to the date
on which the policy is physically transferred to the insured. The
courts, however, could disregard this approach and interpret these
words as referring to the date on which the policy took legal effect.
Since this is remedial legislation designed to protect the insured motor20
ists of the state, it will be construed most favorably to the insured. It
is suggested that all insurance companies attach the endorsement to
original and renewal policies effective on or after July 1, 1961, notwithstanding delivery or issuance for delivery prior to that date.
Because of the low premium of $5.00 for the first private passenger car owned and $4.00 for each additionally owned automobile, it
is expected that between seventy-five and eighty-five per cent of insureds will take advantage of this coverage. 21 Inevitably, however,
implementation of the statute will be accompanied by numerous
legal and practical problems.
THE STANDARD FoRMr

Under the Standard Form uninsured motorist endorsement,2 the
insurer agrees to pay all sums that the insured or his legal representatives are legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or
23
use of the uninsured automobile. Property damage is not covered.
The "insured" includes the named insured as stated in the policy
and any person designated as the named insured in the schedule and,
while residents of the same household, the spouse of the named insured and relatives of either.24 The court may conceivably construe
the phrase while residents of the same household to cover a relative
spending the summer at the insured's household and to exclude the
19. Oss. ATT'y G N. FLA. 061-101 (1961).
20. See Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Harlow, 191 Va. 64, 68, 59 S.E.2d 872, 874
(1950).
21. Letter from J. Edwin Larson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner,
and W. F. Trawick, Chief Deputy Commissioner, to Vern Williams, Miami Daily
News, Oct. 5, 1961. This is a rather conservative figure in the light of the experience of other states. E.g., over 90% of insureds in California have taken advantage of this coverage. Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 516, 518 (1960).
22. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters Standard Form, Family Protection Against Uninsured Motorists (Bodily Injury Liability) A 615a, AL 8601a
(Ed. 5-58). The Standard Form endorsement is approved by the Florida Insurance
Commissioner and is incorporated in the policies of most insurers.
23. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement I.
24. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement II (a) (1).
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named insured's son who was away at college.2 5 This was not the
intent of the underwriters. Preferable wording would be if permanent
residents of the same household. Coverage is afforded members of
this class of insureds even if they are in another's automobile at the
time of an accident. They are also covered as pedestrians.
A second class of insureds includes any person who is entitled to
recover for care or for loss of services because of bodily injury to which
the endorsement applies.2 6 This would encompass the case of a
husband claiming loss of services of his wife, or of a parent claiming
expenses incurred and services lost because of injury to his childY.
The final class of insureds includes any person who is occupying
an insured automobile.28 To determine who falls within this category, the Standard Form specifies, with certain exceptions, three types
of insured automobiles: (1) one owned by the named insured or his
spouse if a resident of the same household, (2) a temporary substitute
automobile, and (3) an automobile while being operated by the
29
named insured or his spouse if a resident of the same household.
Certain exceptions are provided, the most important of which is that
no automobile owned by the named insured or his spouse, aside from
30
the one identified in the policy, is insured.
Coverage is applicable only if the insured collides with an "uninsured automobile," which is defined as a motor vehicle on which
there is no bodily injury bond or insurance policy applicable at the
time of the accident. 31 The endorsement also covers a hit-and-run
automobile that has physical contact with the insured or with an
automobile occupied by the insured at the time of the accident under
the following conditions: (1) The identity of the operator or owner
of the hit-and-run vehicle cannot be ascertained; (2) the accident is
reported to the police within twenty-four hours; and (3) the insured
makes available for inspection the vehicle he was driving.32 Thus,
an insured who is injured as the result of being forced off the highway by an unidentified driver without physical contact cannot collect from his carrier. This requirement is designed to prevent
fraudulent claims.
An "uninsured automobile" does not include (1) an insured automobile, (2) an automobile owned by the named insured or a resident
25. For a similar view, see Morgenbesser, Some Legal Aspects of the New
York Uninsured Motorists' Coverage, 339 INs. L.J. 241, 243 (1956).
26. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement 11 (a) (3).
27. Comment, 48 CALur. L. REv. 516, 519 (1960).
28. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement 11 (a) (2).
29. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement 11 (b) (1), (2)' (3).
30. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement II (b) (3) (i), (ii), (iii).
31. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement 11 (c) (1).
32. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement H (d).
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of the same household, (3) an automobile that is self-insured within
the meaning of the financial responsibility law, (4) automobiles
owned by certain governmental agencies, and (5) certain other vehicles
33
not generally thought of as automobiles.
If the insured's policy contains both an uninsured motorist endorsement and bodily injury liability coverage, any payment made
under one of these provisions is applied in reduction of any payment
received under the other. 34 To illustrate, assume that A, a passenger
in B's car, is injured in an accident with C, an uninsured motorist,
as the result of the gross negligence of B and the negligence of C. A
is entitled to recover under B's uninsured motorist endorsement because he is included within the language any other person while
occupying an insured automobile. A also has a tort claim against B
for bodily injury. But if A suffers bodily injury to the extent of
$4,000 and recovers $2,500 under B's uninsured motorist coverage,
he may recover only $1,500 under B's bodily injury liability coverage.
In addition, any loss payable under the terms of the endorsement is
reduced by the amount paid and by the present value of all future
amounts payable under any workmen's compensation law, exclusive
of non-occupational disability benefits. 35 The insured, however, may
recover fully under both the medical pay coverage and the uninsured motorist endorsement.
Determination of liability and damages is made by agreement
between the parties. If agreement cannot be reached, upon written
demand of either party the issues of liability and damages will be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association. The parties agree to be bound by the award
36
of the arbitrators.
Complex and conflicting "other insurance" provisions appear in
the endorsement to resolve problems that arise when more than one
policy is applicable to the same accident. 37 When the company pays
a claim to its own insured, it is subrogated to the right of the insured
to recover against the uninsured motorist.38 Thus the endorsement
is not a liability policy but is more in the nature of a surety bond.
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE STATUTE AND THE STANDARD

FORM

Although Florida courts have not exhibited a strong tendency
to nullify provisions in insurance contracts as contrary to public
3. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement 11 (c).
84. Standard Form, Condition 4 (b).
85.
86.
37.
88.

Standard Form,
Standard Form,
Standard Form,
Standard Form,

Condition
Condition
Condition
Condition

4 (c).
6.
5.
7.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol14/iss4/8

6

Broad: Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Florida
NOTES
policy or statute, the insurer may not insert terms in the policy that
are in derogation of the express provisions of a legislative enactment3 9
This principle will be applied in the interpretation of the new uninsured motorist law because the language is mandatory and the purpose remedial. In addition, all companies authorized to write automobile liability insurance in Florida have been required to sign a
"Statement of Intention to Comply with the Provisions of Section
627.0851."40 If the insurer issues a policy of automobile liability
insurance without offering the new coverage, and the insured is subsequently injured by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, it is
clear that the courts will read the mandatory provisions of the statute
into the policy and allow the insured to recover against his own
carrier.
The Insured'sRejection of Coverage
The statute provides that no automobile liability policy shall be
delivered or issued for delivery without uninsured motorist insurance; provided, however, that the coverage shall not be applicable
if any insured named in the policy rejects the coverage. 4 Assume
that an automobile liability policy is delivered with an endorsement
specifically excluding uninsured motorist insurance. The insured accepts the policy in this form and is subsequently involved in an
accident with an uninsured driver. May the company deny coverage
on the basis that the insured's acceptance of the policy constituted a
valid rejection of the coverage? The answer must be "no," because
the policy contravenes the express terms of the statute requiring it to
be issued with uninsured motorist coverage. Even if the insured had
executed a written rejection of the coverage prior to delivery of the
policy, the court, by a literal interpretation of the statutory language,
could hold the rejection ineffective. This would be an undesirable
construction in light of the purpose of the new law, which is to acquaint the insured with the coverage and give him an opportunity to
accept or reject it. The insurer, however, should proceed on the
39. Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 853, 856 (5th Cir.
1958) (dictum); Newbern Distrib. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 124 So. 2d 721, 724 (Fla.
1960) (dictum).
40. The Statement of Intention attached to an explanatory letter from J.
Edwin Larson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, to all insurance
companies authorized to write automobile liability insurance in Florida, June 9,
1961, reads as follows: "Automobile liability insurance delivered or issued for
delivery by the undersigned insurer, on or after July 1, 1961, with respect to any
motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in the State of Florida shall be
deemed to comply with section 627.0851 of the Florida Statute unless the insured
named in the policy shall have rejected the Uninsured Motorists' Coverage."
41. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1) (1961).
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assumption that, at least between the time of delivery and subsequent
rejection, every policy issued in Florida contains uninsured motorist
protection.
In a different statutory context, the question has been raised as
2
may effectively reject the coverage on behalf of all insureds.4
who
to
If the named insured executes a rejection, is this waiver binding on
his spouse, his relatives, or permissive users who are subsequently
injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist? The Florida
statute provides that coverage shall not be applicable when "any insured named in the policy" rejects

it.4

3

Consequently, a rejection

executed by any insured named in the policy binds all classes of
insureds unless the court rules that the insured can effectively waive
coverage only as to himself. Adoption of the latter position would
be illogical, since it would afford compulsory uninsured motorist coverage to all permissive users who are unidentified at the time the
policy is delivered and therefore cannot reject the endorsement. Moreover, the insurer then would be providing free coverage, because the
named insured has rejected the coverage and no ascertained person
has agreed to pay the premium. Although the rejection does not have
to be in writing, companies have been alerted to maintain proper
evidence of its execution.

44

Other Consequences of the Statute
Sections 627.0851 (3), (4) state that an uninsured motor vehicle
is deemed to include an insured motor vehicle when its liability carrier is unable to pay the claimant because of insolvency within one
year after the accident. Although this clause does not appear in the
Standard Form, the protection is now included in all uninsured
motorist endorsements by virtue of the Florida statute. This is a
desirable step forward, since many innocent victims must bear the
burden of loss resulting from the financial instability of the tort42. Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 516, 521 (1960).
43. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1) (1961).
44. Letter from J. Edwin Larson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner,
to all companies authorized to write automobile liability insurance in Florida,
June 9, 1961. The following is the form of rejection used by Transit Casualty Co.:
"In accordance with the provision of Florida Insurance Code, Section 627.0851,
Part X of Chapter 627, which permits the insured named in the policy to reject
the Uninsured Motorists (Family Protection) Coverage, the undersigned insured
(and each of them) does hereby reject such coverage, being the coverage provided
for the protection of persons insured under this policy who would be legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom." This type of rejection is not recommended, since its language gives recognition to the theory that the named insured may not waive the coverage for all
insureds.
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feasor's liability carrier. 45 However, the protection may be more
illusory than real under the present wording of the statute, since
many companies of doubtful standing that refuse to pay justifiable
claims cannot be called legally insolvent. 46
The Standard Form excludes bodily injury coverage to an insured while occupying an automobile owned by the named insured
and principally garaged in a state that has not authorized issuance
of uninsured motorist coverage. 47 The statute, however, applies to
any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in Florida. 48 In
case of such conflicts between the express terms of the statute and
the Standard Form, the statute will prevail.
The statute may also expand the coverage afforded by the Standard
Form in one other minor respect. The latter excludes from the category of an insured motor vehicle any automobile used as a public
or livery conveyance, 49 but the statute compels issuance of coverage on
"any motor vehicle."50 The exception in the Standard Form is in
derogation of the express terms of the statute and therefore is void. 51
THE UNINSURED AUTOMOBILE

The Standard Form describes an uninsured automobile as' one
with respect to which there is no bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident.5 2 If at the
time of the accident there was a liability policy that covered the
tort-feasor but the carrier later disclaimed coverage because of the
insured's lack of cooperation, may the insured proceed against his
own carrier under the uninsured motorist endorsement? A New
York court, on similar facts, has held that breach of a condition
subsequent will not place the tort-feasor in the category of an un45. At least 15 companies authorized to write insurance in Florida have
become insolvent since 1948. Interview with Chief Deputy Commissioner W. F.
Trawick, in Tallahassee, Oct. 20, 1961.
46. Presumably the following definition of insolvency appearing in FLA. STAT.
§631.011 (1) (1961) is applicable: "'Impairment' or 'insolvency' means the capital
of a stock insurer or the surplus of a mutual or reciprocal insurer, shall be deemed
to be impaired and the insurer shall be deemed to be insolvent, when such insurer is not possessed of assets at least equal to all liabilities and required reserves together with its total issued and outstanding capital stock if a stock insurer, or the minimum surplus if a mutual or reciprocal insurer, required by this
code to be maintained for the kind or kinds of insurance it is then authorized to
transact."
47. Standard Form, Exclusion (a).
48. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (l) (1961).
49. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement II (b) (i).
50.

FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1) (1961).

'51. For a similar view, see. Comment, 48 CALIF. L. Rev. 516, 522 (1960).
52. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement 11 (c)
(1).
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insured motorist, because there was in fact a policy applicable at the
time of the accident. 53 The possibility that the Florida courts will
reach a contrary conclusion should not be overlooked, because such
a decision would seem more consonant with the over-all purpose of the
uninsured motorist law. However, if there is a failure of a condition
precedent, such as the tort-feasor driving without the permission of
the insured, there is no policy applicable on the date of the accident
and the vehicle is uninsured. But a New York court has held that
mere denial of coverage on this basis by the tort-feasor's carrier does
not entitle the insured to arbitration; if this is a disputed question,
there must first be a judicial determination that the wrongdoer's
5
automobile is uninsured. 4
This problem becomes more difficult if the insured brings suit
against a tort-feasor who appears to have a valid and collectible
policy. The tort-feasor's liability carrier disclaims coverage because
of the failure of a condition precedent. The insured proceeds to
judgment and then sues the wrongdoer's carrier on the policy. The
carrier is successful in disclaiming coverage. The insured now turns
to his own carrier for payment under the uninsured motorist endorsement, since there was no liability policy applicable at the time of the
accident. May the company raise as a defense Exclusion (b) of the
Standard Form, which prohibits the insured from reducing to judgment any claim against the tort-feasor without the written consent of
the company? Or is the exclusion void because the insured could not
know that there was no insurance applicable until he reduced his
claim to judgment and sued the liability insurer on the policy? The
adoption of the former approach by Florida courts would impose
an undue hardship on the insured. 55
OTHER INSURANCE

Difficult problems arise in the interpretation of clauses designed
to determine in advance which insurer shall bear the loss when there
is more than one applicable policy covering the same loss. The
clauses fall into four categories: (1) pro rata clauses, which provide
that the insurer will pay its pro rata share of the loss in the proportion that its policy limit bears to the aggregate liability coverage;
(2) excess clauses, which limit the insurer's liability to that in excess
53. Berman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
54. Application of Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 15 Misc. 2d 692, 182 N.Y.S.2d 899
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
55. For a similar discussion of this problem, see Morgenbesser, Some Legal
Aspects of the New York Uninsured Motorists' Coverage, 399 INs. L.J. 241, 243

(1956).
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of any liability covered under other available insurance; (3) escape
clauses, which afford no coverage when there is other insurance; and
(4) excess-escape clauses, which limit the insurer's liability to the
amount of coverage exceeding limits of other available insurance but
which void the policy when other insurance of equal or greater limits
exists.56 When two policies of insurance contain similar pro rata
clauses, little difficulty is encountered; but when mutually repugnant
clauses meet, the decisions "point in all directions.."'5
The Standard Form uninsured motorist endorsement contains one
excess-escape clause and two pro rata clauses. 58 A series of hypothetical
situations will illustrate the legal problems arising from these unnecessarily complex and conflicting provisions. 59 Assume in the following situations that the limits of liability are $10,000/20,000 and
that both insurers use the Standard Form.
Escape Versus Pro Rata
Able is the named insured under a policy issued by Company A.
While occupying a car owned by Baker, the named insured under a
policy issued by Company B, Able is injured to the extent of $12,000
by an uninsured motorist. With respect to Company A's policy, Able
was at the time of the injury "occupying an automobile not owned
by the named insured," but other similar insurance was available to
him as an occupant of B's car. Therefore, the excess-escape provision
applies; but, since the limit of liability under Company A's policy
does not exceed the limit of liability under Company B's policy, the
escape feature will control. 60 Able is also an insured under Company
B's policy because he is "any other person while occupying an insured automobile,"' but he is a named insured with other similar
insurance available to him. Hence, the pro rata clause found in
paragraph (2) of the "other insurance" condition will apply.62 How
will the court resolve the conflict between the two provisions?
McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc.6 3 involved the construction
of an excess-escape clause that was in opposition to a pro rata clause.
The lessor's policy provided that it should be null and void with
56. For a general discussion of these problems, see Note, 7 ALA. L. Ray. 409
(1955); Note, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 157 (1957).
57. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958,
959 (9th Cir. 1952).
58. Copies of these clauses are found in Appendix B.
59. These hypotheticals are taken from Comment, 48 CALi. L. REv. 516, 523

(1960).
60. See Appendix B, (1).
61. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement II (a) (2).
62. See Appendix B, (2).
63. 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952).
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respect to an accident otherwise covered by other valid insurance;
provided, however, that the policy would constitute excess insurance
in so far as its money limits exceeded that of the other policy. The
escape feature controlled because the policy limits of the lessor's
policy were the lower of the limits in the two insurance contracts. The
lessee's policy prorated the loss in the proportion that its money
limits bore to the total applicable limit of liability of other valid
and collectible insurance against such loss. The court held the lessee's
insurer fully liable because the lessor's policy, which contained the
escape-excess clause, did not conlstitute other valid and collectible insurance within the meaning of the lessee's policy. The case is distinguishable from the hypothetical in that it involved a construction
of "other insurance" clauses appearing in the bodily injury section of
the policy. However, the Florida Supreme Court has cited the McFarland case as "extremely persuasive,"64 and similar reasoning could
be employed to reach an identical result in the hypothetical situation.
Company A's policy, which contained the excess-escape clause, would
prevail because the policy did not constitute "other similar insurance available" within the meaning of Company "B's" policy. Company B would bear a loss of $10,000, and Able would bear a loss of
$2,000.
Another court has reached a different result in a situation vir65
tually identical with that in McFarland.
The court held that the
lessee's policy was other valid insurance within the meaning of the lessor's policy only to the extent of its pro rata liability. Since
both policies contained the same money limits, each insurer was
liable for one half of the face amount of the policy. The same result could be reached in the hypothetical situation. Each company
would bear a loss of $5,000, and Able would bear a loss of $2.000.
Pro Rata Versus Pro Rata
Baker owns a Ford and a Buick. Company F insures the Ford,
Company B insures the Buick, and Baker is the named insured under
both policies. While occupying his Ford, Baker is injured to the
extent of $12,000 by an uninsured motorist. Under both policies
Baker qualifies as a "named insured under other similar insurance
available to him"; therefore, the pro rata clause in paragraph (2)
64. Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So. 2d'367 (Fla. 1954), 46
A.L.R.2d
1159 (1954). In a conflict between "other insurance" provisions of two bodily
injury liability policies, the Court gave effect to an escape clause that conflicted
with an excess clause.
65. Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d
129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949).
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of both policies applies.66 Each company bears a loss of $5,000, and
Baker bears a loss of $2,000.
Excess-Escape Versus Excess-Escape
Baker owns a Ford and a Buick. Company F insures the Ford,
and Company B insures the Buick. Able is a relative of Baker and
is a member of his household, thus qualifying as an insured under
both policies.67 While occupying another automobile that does not
have uninsured motorist coverage, Able is injured to the extent of
$12,000. The excess-escape clauses in both policies appear to apply
because Able is "occupying an automobile not owned by a named
insured."08 But to give both clauses full effect would mean that Able
has no coverage under either policy.
The fair solution would be to void both clauses. this approach
was taken by a federal district court in a case arising in Miami.69
The court voided two excess clauses because to give them both
effect would extinguish liability, on both policies and leave the insured without protection. In this situation the "catch-all" pro rata
dlause appearing in'paragraph (3) of the "other insurance" condition
should apply. Under its provisions each insurer would bear a loss of
$6,000.0
Excess Versus Pro Rata
Able, the named insured under a policy issued by Company A
with limits of $10,000/20,000, is injured to the extent of $7,500 by
an uninsured motorist while occupying a car owned by Baker, a
named insured under a policy issued by Company B with limits of
55,000/10,000. The excess-escape clause of Company A's policy applies because Able at the time of the injury was occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured, but the excess feature controls
because the limits of Company A's policy are higher than those of
Company B's policy."' The pro rata clause appearing in paragraph
(2) of Company B's policy applies because Able at the time of the
66. See Appendix B, (2).
67. Standard Form, Insuring Agreement II (a) (1).
68. See Appendix B, 1 (1).
69.

Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 163 F.

Supp. 325 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
70. The pro rata clause of (2) provides that the "damages shall be deemed
not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and
such other insurance .... ." Par. (3) does not contain this limiting language.
Thus, if it were possible to invoke f (2), each insurer would bear a loss of $5,000
and Able would bear a loss of $2,000. Since 2 is inapplicable, Able may recover
$6,000 from each insurer under the more liberal terms of (3).

71. See Appendix B, 11(1).
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injury was a named insured under similar insurance available to
him.72 If the Florida courts adopt the reasoning of the McFarland
case, full effect will be given to the excess clause. Company B will be
liable for its policy limits, $5,000, and Company A will be liable for
$2,500. On the other hand, the courts could give full effect to the
pro rata clause; Company B would then pay $2,500 and Company
A $5,000.
Courts attempting to reconcile conflicting "other insurance" provisions will always disappoint the contractual expectations of at least
one insuring company. The fairest solution would be to void both
clauses as hopelessly in conflict and prorate the loss between the
carriers in the proportion that the policy limits bear to the total
amount of insurance available.73 A standard "other insurance" clause
74
would be a proper subject for legislative action.
SUBROGATION

The New York Department of Motor Vehicles has estimated that
a thirty-three-and-one-third per cent recovery may be obtained from
culpable uninsured motorists.75 Therefore, the insurer's subrogation
rights assume importance. The Florida statute provides that in the
event of payment to any person under the coverage, the company
making the payment shall to that extent be entitled to the proceeds of
any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights
of recovery of the insured against any person or organization legally
responsible for the accident.76 In addition, Condition 7 of the
Standard Form compels the insured to hold in trust all rights of
recovery against the tort-feasor for the benefit of the company and
to prosecute his claim against the wrongdoer if requested by the insurer. Whether this subrogation agreement constitutes an invalid
attempt to assign a personal injury claim at common law is unimportant, since the statute gives the insurer subrogation rights.77
See Appendix B, [ (2).
73. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952).
74. CAL. INS. CODE §11580.2(c) takes a different approach: "The insurance
coverage provided for in this section does not apply: . . . (2) To bodily injury
of the insured sustained while in or upon or while entering into or alighting from
an automobile other than the described automobile if the owner thereof has
insurance similar to that provided in this section." For an analysis of the
effect of the California statute on the hypotheticals posed in this note, see Comment, 48 CALiF. L. REV. 516, 523 (1960).
75. George, Insuring Injuries Catsed by Uninsured Motorists, 406 INS. L.J.
715, 718 (1956).
76. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (4) (1961).
77. For a discussion of this problem, see Morgenbesser, supra note 55, at 244.
72.
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Distribution of the uninsured motorist's assets may entail problems
when the insured's actual damages exceed the policy limits. If the
insured's damages are $12,000 and the insurer pays the policy limit
of $10,000, how should a recovery of $3,000 from the uninsured motorist be distributed between the company and the insured?78
The insurer may contend that it has first claim to the assets and
that the remainder, if any, goes to the insured. This contention is
supported by the Florida statute, which provides that the insurer is
subrogated to the insured's right of recovery against the tort-feasor
"to the extent of its payment to the insured." 79 Also, this view is consistent with the purpose of the Florida statute, which permits the insured to recover the amount he could have secured had the tort-feasor
carried the minimum limits prescribed by the financial responsibility
law. In addition, to allow the insured priority over the insurer would
permit a trustee to defeat the interests of his cestui que trust.80
The insured may assert a prior claim to the assets of the uninsured motorist on the theory that his insurer functions under the
statute as a substitute for the tort-feasor's liability carrier. Thus, if
the uninsured motorist were insured, his liability carrier would
pay $10,000, and the uninsured motorist would be personally liable
for the remainder of the claim.
A third solution would be to prorate the assets between the insured and the company in proportion to their respective claims.
It should be noted that if the insured has an accident with two
negligent parties, one of whom is insured, the company is subrogated
to the rights of the insured against both parties, because, by the terms
of the statute and the Standard Form, it is entitled to the proceeds
The insured may argue that Condition 7 (d) of the Standard Form, which requires
the insured to bring suit against the tort-feasor if requested to do so by the
company, is void because FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (4) (1961) entitles the insurer only
"to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any
rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible . . ." for the accident. Hence, the insured is under no compulsion to
prosecute his claim against the wrongdoer; the rights of the insurer arise only after
the negotiation of a settlement or the entry of a judgment. The company would
argue that §627.0851 (4) provides a meaningless right if it cannot compel the insured to file suit in accordance with Condition 7 (d) of the Standard Form or
prosecute the claim in its own name under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.17 (a) as the real
party in interest. The insurer would also contend that the uninsured motorist
law does not specifically prevent the company from exercising the rights of its
insured against the tort-feasor. Since the statute is silent or at best ambiguous,
resort to Condition 7(d) of the Standard Form is necessary. The company's position is a logical one that comports with the purpose of the Florida law.
78. See Comment, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 516, 527, n.62 (1960), for a fuller discussion
of the alternatives.
79. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (4) (1961).
80. See note 78 supra.
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received from any person or organization responsible for the accident."'
WORKM EN'S COMPENSATION

The owners of many commercial fleets will not take advantage
of uninsured motorist coverage because their employees are covered
by workmen's compensation. But if an employee is covered, either
personally or by the company, under the new law and is injured by
an uninsured' motorist in the course of his employment, he may
recover from the uninsured motorist insurer and from his employer's
workmen's 'compensation carrier. The interaction of the two coverages will create several problems. Is the compensation carrier subrogated to the insured's right of recovery against the uninsured motorist insurer? To what extent may the insured recover against his own
carrier when he has received compensation benefit? Since both of the
insurers are subrogated against the uninsured motorist, which has a
prior.claim to his assets?
SubrogationRights of the Compensatzon Carrier
In Florida, an employer or his compensation carrier, as the case
may be, is subrogated to the rights of an employee against the "third
party tort-feasor" to the extent of compensation payments. 8 2 If the
third party tort-feasor has liability insurance, his company must
respect the claim of the compensation carrier. Hence, it is likely
that the compensation carrier will assert subrogation rights against
the uninsured motorist insurer, on the theory that the latter becomes
the liability insurer of the tort-feasor. Exclusion (c) of the Standard
Form, attempting to prevent this result, provides:
"This endorsement does not apply: so as to inure directly
or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's compensation
or disability benefits carrier or any person or organization
qualifying as a self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or any similar law."
The court can void this provision if it is found to be in derogation
of the compensation carrier's statutory right of subrogation against
the third-party tort-feasor. This contention was advanced when the
commissioner of the New York insurance fund attempted to enforce
a lien, to the extent of compensation payments, upon the insured's
proceeds of a settlement with his uninsured motorist carrier 8 3 The
81. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (4) (1961); Standard Form, Condition 7 (a).
82. FLA. STAT. §440.39 (2) (1961).
83. Commissioners of the State Ins. Fund v. Miller, 4 App. Div. 2d 481, 166
N.Y.S.2d 777 (1st Dep't 1957).
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court held that the uninsured motorist insurer is not the alter
ego of the tort-feasor; it does not become the liability insurer of the
wrongdoer. Its obligation to the insured is founded in contract,
although it is premised upon the contingency of a third party's tort
liability. Even if the employee fails to assert his contractual rights
of recovery against the insurer, the compensation carrier cannot
assert subrogation rights.
Extent of Employee's Recovery
Condition 4 (c) of the Standard Form provides that any loss payable under the endorsement shall be reduced by the amount paid
and the present value of future amounts payable under any workmen's compensation law, exclusive of non-occupational disability
benefits. For example, if the limit of the endorsement is $10,000 and
the amount paid or payable in workmen's compensation benefits is
$3,000, maximum recovery under the endorsement will be $7,000.4
If the insurer and the insured agree 'that the latter's injuries are
worth $6,500, the company will make a payment of $3,500. The
effect of the clause is to reduce both the limits of liability and any
payment made to the insured by the amount paid or payable under
the workmen's compensation law.
Priorityof the Compensation Carner
Under the Florida statutes, 85 both the compensation carrier and
the company issuing uninsured motorist coverage have a right of
subrogation against the third-party tort-feasor. When both have
made payments to the insured, each will naturally desire to have
prior claim to the assets of the uninsured motorist. The workmen's
ompensation statute provides, however, that the employer or the
compensation carrier may file a notice of payment of compensation
and medical benefits that will constitute a lien on the proceeds of
any judgment against the tort-feasor.86 No such benefit is given to
the company writing the uninsured motorist endorsement.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION

The Florida limitation of action upon a contract not under seal
is five years,8' 7 while the limitation upon a tort action for personal
84. See Plummer, Handling Claims Under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage,
415 INs. LJ. 494, 496 (1957).
85. FLA. STAT. § §440.39, 627.0851 (4) (1961).
86. FLA. STAT. §440.39 (3) (1961).
87. FLA. STAT. §95.11 (3) (1961).
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injury is four years."" Which period of limitation will bar the insured's right of recovery against his insurer? It has been argued that
the four-year period should apply, since the insured will have destroyed the company's right of subrogation by failing to bring an
action within that time. There is little merit to this contention,
because under the trust agreement the insurer may compel the insured to bring suit against the tort-feasor.8 9 If the insurer fails to
enforce this provision, he alone has destroyed his subrogation rights.
Another argument is that if the insured permits the four-year statute
to run without filing suit against the tort-feasor, he is no longer
legally entitled to recover damages for his injuries. Technically, however, the insured still has a legal right to recover; it is only his remedy
that is barred by the statute of limitations. 90
It is more logical to apply the five-year statute of limitation, because the insured's action against his insurer is founded in contract.
In a recent New York case 9 the insured had a collision with two
negligent tort-feasors, one of whom was uninsured. The insured
sued the tort-feasor who had liability coverage and settled the matter
for $1,500; he then made claim under the uninsured motorist endorsement and informed the company that he had made a settlement
with a third party, who was also responsible. The company filed an
action to stay arbitration proceedings on the basis that the insured
had breached a policy condition by failing to forward a copy of the
summons and complaint to the insurer. The insurer was estopped
from asserting non-coverage because (1) it had negotiated with the
insured, had appointed an appraiser, and had done other acts inconsistent with a denial of coverage, and (2) the insurer's behavior
had "tended to lull the insured into a sense of security" and had
caused his action against the uninsured driver to be barred by the
statute of limitations. This decision is founded on the premise that
there need not be a valid subsisting claim against the uninsured
motorist in order to allow recovery under the endorsement; indeed,
it imposes an affirmative duty on the company to see that the insured's cause of action against the wrongdoer is not barred by the
running of the limitations period.
THE ARBITRATION

CLAUSE

Condition 6 of the Standard Form provides that the issues of legal
liability and damages shall be resolved by agreement between the
_88.

FLA. STAT. §95.11 (4) (1961).

89. Standard Form, Condition 7 (d).
90. For a similar discussion, see Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 516, 531 (1960).
91. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wildman, 21 Misc. 2d 1073, 197 N.Y.S.2d 925
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
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insured and the company or that, if they fail to agree, either party
may commence arbitration by giving written notice of intention to
arbitrate under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. A
full discussion of the procedures relating to arbitration is found in
the Association's pamphlet "Accident Claims Tribunal Rules."'9 2 Two
copies of the notice, which sets forth the matter in dispute, the
amount of damages, and the remedy sought, must be filed with the
administrator of the Accident Claims Tribunal. 93 Both parties may
be represented by counsel. 94 The insured and the insurer agree to
be bound by the award of the arbitrators; however, a judgment based
upon this award may be entered in any court of competent
jurisdiction05
The frequency of arbitration under the uninsured motorist endorsement is unknown. One insurance executive stated that of 2,686
claims submitted to his company up to July 1958, 200, or about
seven per cent, proceeded to arbitration. 96 Other reports indicate
that less than one per cent of all claims reach arbitration. 97 Whatever the volume of arbitration may be, its presence in the Standard
Form raises several problems. Is the provision to arbitrate a future
dispute valid under Florida law? Does the arbitration requirement
apply only with respect to the question of liability and damage?
May the insured successfully avoid the arbitration proviso?
Validity
The arbitration provision in the Standard Form constitutes an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes and as such is invalid under
the common law. 98 Moreover, two states making the issuance of uninsured motorist coverage compulsory forbid by statute the arbitra92. A copy of this pamphlet may be procured from the American Arbitration
Association, 477 Madison Ave., New York 22, N.Y.
93.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AccIDENT CLAIM TRIBUNAL RuLs.S, Rule

III, §7.
94. Id. Rule V, §15. For a discussion of the award of attorney's fees in arbitration proceedings under the uninsured motorist endorsement, see Kuvin, Attorney's Fees in Arbitration Pursuant to the Uninsured Motorist Policy Provision,
35 FLA. Bj. 436 (1961).
95. Standard Form, Condition 6.
96. Mr. George Kline, Vice-President and General Counsel of Allstate Insurance Co., as reported in Hume, Uninsured Automobile Insurance Coverage, 48
ILL. B.J. 176, 182 (1959).
97. Fieting, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage, 28 INS.
COUNSEL J. 629, 633 (1961) (only 646 cases were arbitrated by the Association in
1960); Comment, 48 CALIF. L. Rv. 516, 532 (1960).
98. For a statement of the common law position, see Boughton v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960), 79 A.L.R.2d 1245 (1961).
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tion of controversies arising under the endorsement. 99 The Standard
Form provision is valid in Florida, however, since the new Florida
arbitration code provides that two or more parties may agree to
arbitrate future disputes. 1 00
Scope
The arbitration provision in Condition 6 of the Standard Form
clearly indicates the scope of its application:
"If any person making claim hereunder and the company do
not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile
because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to
the amount of payment which may be owing under this endorsement, then, upon written demand of either, the matter
or matters upon which such person and the company do not
agree shall be settled by arbitration ...."
This language compels arbitration of unresolved issues of liability
and damages. Does it encompass questions of coverage? The New
York courts originally took the position that coverage questions
are not subject to compulsory arbitration. 10 1 But several recent New
York decisions have generated confusion in this area. The First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, held that the arbitration clause encompasses a dispute as to whether the tort-feasor's automobile was insured. 102 Two
trial court decisions of similar import were affirmed in per curiam
opinions of the same court.'0 3 A trial court in the Second Department has also held that the arbitration clause encompasses the
question whether the wrongdoer's automobile was insured. 04 The
99. S. C. CoDE §46-750.23-6 (Supp. 1960); VA. CODE ANN. §38.1-381 (g) (Supp.
1960).
100. FLA. STAT. §57.11 (1961).
101. Application of Phoenix Assur. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 998, 194 N.Y.S.2d 770
(3d Dep't 1959); Berman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d
869 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Application of Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 15 Misc. 2d 692, 182
N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Ross v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 13 Misc. 2d 739, 173
N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
102. Matter of Bankers and Shippers Ins. Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d
604 (Ist Dep't 1960), rehearing denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 625, 197 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Ist
Dep't 1960), appeal denied, 7 N.Y.2d 711, 199 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1960). For a full
discussion of this problem, see Fieting, supra note 97, at 630.
103. Royal Indem. Co. v. McMahon, 10 App. Div. 2d 926, 200 NX.S.2d 950
(1st Dep't 1960); Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Kirby, 12 App.
Div. 2d 739, 208 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (Ist Dep't 1961).
104. Application of Travelers Indem. Co., 26 Misc. 2d 513, 205 N.Y.S.2d 741
(Sup.,Ct. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 13 App. Div. 2d 507, 212 N.Y.S.2d- 427 (2d
Dep't 1961). The insured had waived his alleged right to arbitrate a *coverage
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decision was based upon the ground that any ambiguity in the arbitration clause should be construed against the insurer, but the court
did not specify the alleged ambiguous language.
All case law on this question has developed in New York, because uninsured motorist coverage has been extensively employed for
a long period of time in that state. 05 But the arbitration provision
of the present New York endorsement is similar to that in the
Standard Form. 106 Since the arbitration requirement is in derogation
of the common law right to a judicial determination, it is difficult to
agree with the decisions holding that the arbitration clause encompasses coverage questions. Insurers in Florida may contend that coverage disputes are not subject to arbitration and that any attempt to arbitrate before a coverage question is judicially resolved is premature. 0 7
Avoidance
If the uninsured motorist initiates suit against the insured, the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure compel the insured to counterclaim
or to forfeit his cause of action.:ls May the insurer, by withholding
its consent to litigation, place the insured in the dilemma of choosing
between forfeiture of his legal claim against the uninsured motorist
and loss of his rights under the policy? 0 9 Presumably, the compulsory
counterclaim provision of the Florida rules will prevail over the consent clause of the policy, and the insured may counterclaim without
losing his rights under the policy.
Assuming that the policy remains in effect, if judgment is entered
in favor of the insured on his counterclaim, the question of the
insurer's arbitration rights may arise. The insured may contend that
application of the arbitration provision when judgment has been
question because he had filed a suit for declaratory judgment to determine the
coverage issue.
105. For a discussion of the New York cases dealing with the arbitration clause,
see Cheek, Recovery Procedure Under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage of the
Family Liability Policy, A.B.A. Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation
Law 281, 285 (Proceedings 1960). See also Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1252, 1258 (1961).
106. See Fieting, supra note 97, at 631.
107. Application of Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 15 Misc. 2d 692, 182 N.Y.S.2d
899 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Ross v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 13 Misc. 2d 739, 173 N.Y.S.2d
941 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
108. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.13 (a).
109. In Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961), the
insured sued the insurer to recover the amount of a judgment he had obtained
against the uninsured motorist. The court held that the arbitration provision
was not binding because it required arbitration of the question of liability. Since
the insurer had denied liability on the uninsured motorist endorsement,- the court
held that it could not defend on the basis that the insured did not receive the
permission of the insurer to file suit against the uninsured motorist.
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entered is unnecessary because there has been a legal determination
of liability and damages. Moreover, arbitration would conflict with
the Florida statute, which provides that the company must pay all
sums that the insured is legally entitled to recover from the uninsured
motorist.11 ° Application of the arbitration provision in this situation
would also conflict with Insuring Agreement I of the Standard Form,
which contains language similar to that of the statute; this creates
an ambiguity that should be resolved in favor of the insured. Conversely, the company will argue that it has based the premium on the
validity of the arbitration clause, which is designed to avoid the unpredictability and liberality of jury damage awards.
Exceptional cases may arise in which the insurer will readily consent to litigate. For example, if the statute of limitations has almost
run, litigation may be necessary to preserve the insurer's subrogation
rights. After judgment is entered, the insurer's right to arbitrate becomes as doubtful as in the compulsory counterclaim context. Moreover, in this case the insurer's consent to litigate will probably constitute a waiver of its arbitration right unless the insurer specifically
reserves the privilege to arbitrate after trial.111
The arbitration requirement will occasionally result in redetermination of identical issues, since if the arbitrators resolve the
issue of liability and damages in favor of the insured, the company
must proceed against the uninsured motorist in a court of law to
protect its subrogation rights. There is no assurance, of course, that
the court will assess damages in the same amount as the arbitrator's
finding, and the company may be completely denied recovery on the
basis that the uninsured motorist was not liable. In addition, coverage questions are resolved in one forum, while the issues of liability
and damages are resolved in another, which will prolong the time required for recovery. Despite these problems, arbitration will be an
effective procedure in most cases arising under the uninsured motorist
endorsement.
CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY

The EthicalPosition of the Insurer
Suppose that an insured covered only by a bodily injury liability
policy collides with an uninsured motorist. The insured is injured
to the extent of $10,000 and the uninsured motorist is injured to the
extent of $6,000. The company and the insured have an identical
110. FLA. STAT. §627.0851 (1) (1961).
111. For a similar view, see Morgenbesser, Some Legal Aspects of the New
York Uninsured Motorists' Coverage, 399 INs. L.J. 241, 243 (1956); Comment, 48
CALIF. L. RFv. 516, 533 (1960).
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purpose: to defeat the potential claim for bodily injury damage on
the part of the uninsured motorist. The insurer will usually get
excellent cooperation from the insured; and the company, at least
in the case of small claims, will resolve coverage questions in favor
of the insured to retain his patronage.
But if the insured carries the uninsured motorist endorsement as
well as bodily injury liability coverage, the company finds itself faced
with a premium-paying customer who is also a claimant. What posture will the insurance company now assume? It may try to find
contributory negligence on the part of both the insured and the
uninsured motorist so that neither is legally entitled to recover
damages. If this is not possible, all efforts of the insurer may be
directed toward finding negligence on the part of its insured, since
he has suffered the more serious injuries. In short, the insurance
company will attempt to minimize its own loss, which in many instances will result in subverting the interests of the insured.
The problem comes into even sharper focus when the insured has
recovered $10,000 in arbitration proceedings. The company, in order
to assert its subrogation right, must now go into a court of law; but
the insured, who has just won a bitter battle with the company, will
hardly be eager to cooperate with his former adversary.
Most of the criticism of the uninsured motorist endorsement has
been directed toward this conflict of interests. 112 Although theoretically the ethical position of the insurer appears untenable, if the
small number of claims reaching arbitration is accepted as an accurate indication, the companies have been able to work out satisfactory
settlements in the vast majority of cases. Perhaps the reasons are that
the insured approaches his insurer with a certain amount of good
will and that he is compelled by the cooperation clause to furnish
complete medical information, so that the company may estimate the
damages accurately. Although the insurer's claim examiners are bound
to minimize loss, good business practice demands that they treat the
insured with fairness in order to retain his patronage. These factors
help to explain the popularity of the coverage.
The Insurer'sRight to Appoint Counsel
Suppose that the insured is seriously injured in an accident with
an uninsured motorist who suffers little injury. The uninsured motorist files suit and the insured counterclaims. The insurer must pay any
judgment rendered against the insured under the bodily injury
liability coverage of the policy; and if the arbitration provision of
112.

Opgenorth, A Critical Review of Unsatisfied Judgment Insurance, 390

INs. L. J. 458 (1955).
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the Standard Form is void in this situation,113 the insurer is bound
to'pay the judgment rendered against the uninsured motorist on the
counterclaim. It is in the company's interest to find negligence on the
part of its own insured, because his injuries are more serious. Two
problems arise in this hypothetical situation: (1) May the insurer
appoint counsel to defend the insured against the claim of the uninsured motorist, and (2) may the insurer appoint counsel to defend the uninsured motorist against the counterclaim of the insured?
Defense Against the Claim of the Uninsured Motorist. Normally
the insurer has exclusive control over litigation against its insured,'14
but the carrier is held to a strict rule of good faith in the defense of
its insured.11 5 It will be advantageous for the company to secure a
legal determination of liability against its insured when he is more
seriously injured than the uninsured motorist. The court should
recognize this conflict of interests by permitting the insured to appoint counsel of his own choosing. But, as will be shown later, it
may be desirable for the insured to insist that the company fulfill
its policy obligation to provide defense counsel despite this conflict
of interests.
Defense Against the Counterclaim of the Insured. If the insurer
is bound to pay the judgment rendered against the uninsured motorist on the counterclaim 16 as well as that against the insured, it will
also assert the right to appoint counsel to defend the uninsured motorist. The insured probably cannot object to this on the basis that it
prejudices his rights of recovery under the uninsured motorist endorsement, because the insurer agrees to pay only the sum that the
insured is legally entitled to recover under that coverage. But if
the insured insists that the insurer fulfill its policy obligation to defend
the claim against him, thus relying on the ethics of the bar, the
court should prevent the company from also defending the uninsured
motorist. To hold otherwise would allow the company to appoint
counsel for both sides of the same suit.
The legal problems arising from this conflict of interests are
equally complex when both parties have suffered serious injuries or
when the uninsured motorist is more severely injured than the insured. There is no solution that will satisfy all parties. Perhaps the
best approach is to allow each party to appoint his own counsel. It
should be noted that the problem does not arise if the judgment
113. See discussion under heading entitled "Avoidance," supra.
114.

7A

APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE

§4681 (1962).

.115. Id. §4687."
116. See discussion under heading entitled "Avoidance," supra.
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against the uninsured motorist does not bind the company because
of the arbitration agreement.
CONCLUSION

The frequency and severity of automobile accidents have made it
necessary to devise a system by which the burden of loss may be
shifted from the innocent traffic victim to the insurance company.
Financial responsibility laws cannot completely solve the problem
because proof of financial responsibility need be established only after
the first accident. Widespread usage of the new uninsured motorist
insurance will close this gap. Although many problems will arise,
the private insurance industry as well as the Florida legislature and
the insurance department should be commended for providing the
117
public with an effective new coverage.
NORMAN BROAD
APPENDIX A - FLORIDA STATUTE §627.0851 (1961)
(1) No automobile liability insurance, covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto,
in not less than limits described in §324.021 (7), under provisions filed with and
approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators
of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, however, that the coverage required
under this section shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy
shall reject the coverage.
(2) For the purposes of this coverage the term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall,
subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include an
insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its insured within the limits specified
therein because of insolvency.
(3) An insurer's insolvency protection shall be applicable only to accidents
occurring during a policy period in which its insured's uninsured motorist coverage
is in effect where the liability insurer of the tort-feasor becomes insolvent within
one year after such an accident. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prevent any insurer from affording insolvency protection under terms and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is provided hereunder.
(4) In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by
this section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the insurer
117. The writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance of J. Edwin Larson,
State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, W. F. Trawick, Chief Deputy Insurance Commission, and the staff of the Carolina Insurance Group, especially Andre
Schwitter, Jr., Secretary and Treasurer, Donnell P. Davis, Vice-President, George
N. Study, Legal Supervisor, and Wayne F. Martin, Liability Supervisor.
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making such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of
any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery
of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily
injury for which such payment is made, including the proceeds recoverable from
the assets of the insolvent insurer.
APPENDIX B - STANDARD FORM, CONDITION 5
Par. (1)
ExcessEscape
Clause

Par. (2)
Pro Rata
Clause

Par. (.3)
Pro Rata
Clause

Other Insurance: With respect to bodily injury to an insured while
occupying an automobile now owned by a named insured under this
endorsement, the insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such occupant,
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the
applicable limit of liability of this endorsement exceeds the sum of the
applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance.
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying or
through being struck by an uninsured automobile, if such insured is a
named insured under other similar insurance available to him, then
the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the
company shall not be liable under this endorsement for a greater proportion of the applicable limit of liability of this endorsement than
such limit bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance.
Subject to the foregoing paragraphs, if the insured has other similar
insurance available to him against a loss covered by this endorsement,
the company shall not be liable under this endorsement for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability hereunder
bears to the total applicable limits of liability of all valid and collectible
insurance against such loss.
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